A clause in your contract says one thing, while in practice you did something else. How does the CAS read such an agreement when Swiss law applies subsidiarily? The award CAS 2025/A/11575 of 1 April 2026 gives a clear answer. We explain what the sole arbitrator decided and why.
Why Swiss law comes into play
Under Article R58 of the CAS Code, a panel first applies the applicable regulations. Subsidiarily, it applies the law chosen by the parties or, absent a choice, the law of the country where the federation is domiciled. Article 49(2) of the FIFA Statutes refers additionally to Swiss law. Here, that meant the FIFA regulations and the Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO).
The case in brief
On 22 December 2023, Atlético Mineiro and Nottingham Forest concluded a transfer agreement for EUR 5,000,000, payable in three instalments: EUR 2,000,000 by 11 January 2024, EUR 1,500,000 by 2 January 2025 and EUR 1,500,000 by 15 December 2025. Under clause 3.4, each payment was subject to receipt of a valid invoice and had to be made within 14 calendar days. Under clause 3.4.1, there was no obligation to pay without an invoice.
On 1 January 2024, Nottingham sent a single invoice showing the total, the three instalments and their due dates. Mineiro paid the first instalment and, of the second, EUR 500,000 on 16 January and EUR 500,000 on 27 January 2025. The last EUR 500,000 remained unpaid. After a notice of 20 March 2025, Nottingham invoked the acceleration clause, so the third instalment also fell due. On 14 July 2025, the FIFA Players’ Status Chamber ordered Mineiro to pay both amounts with 5% interest and imposed a warning. On appeal, Mineiro argued that a separate invoice was required for the second instalment.
Article 18 SCO: the true intention comes first
Article 18 SCO requires the true and common intention of the parties to be ascertained, without dwelling on inexact expressions. Following the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the arbitrator proceeded in two stages: first a subjective interpretation, and only if that yields nothing, an objective interpretation under the principle of trust. The wording plays an important role but is not decisive. A purely literal reading is excluded under Article 18 SCO.
The wording of clause 3.4 was of little help here. “A valid invoice” in the singular pointed to a single invoice, but the 14-day period after receipt of “that invoice” seemed rather to suggest one invoice per instalment. According to the arbitrator, neither reading was prima facie unreasonable.
Conduct after signing was decisive
What proved decisive was what Mineiro did after signing. The arbitrator counted at least nine acts or omissions showing that the club itself never expected a second invoice. It did not object to the single invoice and paid the first instalment. When Nottingham asked in December 2024 whether it had everything needed for the payment, it reported nothing missing. On 7 January 2025, it apologised by email for “the delay and default incurred by our club” and asked for a delay until the end of April. It then paid EUR 500,000 twice without reservation, and did not respond to later emails and three formal letters.
Why would a club pay two thirds of an instalment that, in its view, was not yet due? The arbitrator found no reasonable answer. The common intention was that the January 2024 invoice was sufficient.
The principle of trust leads to the same result
Read objectively, the defence also failed. The principle of trust looks at the meaning each party could and should, in good faith, have given to the other’s declarations. A second invoice would only repeat what was already in the first. According to the arbitrator, insisting on it to withhold payment is not in good faith.
No defence of non-performance
Mineiro also relied on Article 82 SCO, which allows a party to withhold performance as long as the other party does not perform or offer to perform its own. That presupposes a failure by the counterparty. With the January 2024 invoice, Nottingham had fulfilled its obligation, so there was nothing to withhold.
Default, interest and acceleration
Under Article 102(2) SCO, a debtor is automatically in default once an agreed due date expires, here from 3 January 2025. The notice in clause 3.6 applied only to acceleration, which was correctly invoked on 5 April 2025.
According to the arbitrator, interest on the accelerated amount is not a double sanction. Default interest under Article 104 SCO is compensation and amounts to at least 5% per year. An acceleration clause merely deprives the debtor of the benefit of the term (Articles 75 et seq. SCO) and adds no amount. A real penalty is a penalty clause under Articles 160 to 163 SCO, which was not at issue here. Contractual freedom under Article 19 SCO and the principle of pacta sunt servanda did the rest. The warning under Article 12bis RSTP was also upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
What you can take from this
- Your conduct after signing can weigh more than the letter of a clause. A payment, an email or a silence can later serve as interpretation of the contract.
- If you believe a condition has not been met, say so immediately and in writing. A defence that only appears in the proceedings is weak.
- Keep drafts, emails and proof of payment. The panel looks for the true intention, and those documents are needed for that.
- Review payment, acceleration and interest clauses before you sign. In this case, the CAS applied them as the parties had agreed.
Further questions? Do not hesitate to contact us on 09/334.94.70, via the contact form or via sport@everest-law.be.